NGOs under fire mull security options (Canadian Security October 2008)


Contact: Mr. Sunil Ram
Media Security Consultant
TEL: 705.788.1957
www.executivesecurity.ca


At one time, NGOs in the world’s hot spots were granted some degree of immunity from violence by their status as aid workers. But that’s changing, as they’re increasingly becoming the target of attacks by sectarian and terrorist groups. The Taliban is now targeting aid workers in Afghanistan; a Canadian woman was killed last month, and 19 aid workers have been killed so far in 2008.


Garda’s High-Risk Markets group, called GardaWorld, has been working with non-government organizations using low profile, intelligence-led and risk-avoidance methods in conflict areas. “There are a lot of organizations out there that don’t have security, that don’t have a crisis response planned, so if something did happen, they’d be starting right from the bottom,” says Neil MacKinnon, director of crisis response and intelligence with GardaWorld. “We tend to work under the assumption that something is going to happen sometime.”

There are more than 600 Canadian NGOs; GardaWorld is in talks with some of those about their security situation. The argument for private security is that as long as those perpetrating the violence can succeed in forcing NGOs to withdraw from a hot spot, they will prevent order from being restored.

Many NGOs don’t want to use private security, however, because being surrounded by armed guards gives off the wrong impression to the people they’re trying to help.

“The reality is, things have changed dramatically,” says Sunil Ram, director of operations with Executive Security Services International. “We’ve had Canadians kidnapped. We just had [three aid workers] with the International Rescue Committee killed in Afghanistan.”

As a result, NGOs are getting more proactive when it comes to security, such as providing cultural immersion training before deploying aid workers. This includes learning basic words in the local language, how to dress like the locals and how to avoid standing out (by, say, not driving fancy cars). If you’re traveling in a convoy, for example, that alone can make you a target.

There are also legal considerations, since the courts are now holding employers responsible for the well being of their workers, especially in hot spots like Iraq, Afghanistan and Darfur. “More of these humanitarian groups are getting it, they’re understanding we have to spend a lot more money [on security],” says Ram. “It should be going to food shipments, but the reality is, your food is not going to get from Point A to Point B because Buddy and his gang are going to stop you, maybe kill you, maybe take you hostage, and steal all your food anyway. Look what happened in Darfur.”

While these risks are not new, in today’s world, NGOs are much more deliberate in putting explicit security policies and procedures in place. “Many years ago I worked in Central America,” says Robert Fox, executive director of Oxfam Canada. “I was often in a situation of conflict, but there wasn’t as much guidance and clear procedures. Now we recognize that the situation of our staff is very precarious and we have a responsibility as an organization to think through the various scenarios and ensure that we’re minimizing any risks.”

Aid workers do not travel alone, for example, and they don’t go anywhere without their walkie-talkies. They also check in with their central base at designated times. The security situation can move from one level to another, which means another set of protocols would come into play.

“On any given day we may well identify that in fact we have reached a point where we have to suspend operations – and we have done that,” he says. “In parts of Darfur there are particular camps where we have stopped operations because we cannot provide by any means reliable support to staff in those situations.”

But he says there’s an increasing concern at the blurring roles between military, private security and humanitarian organizations, because it can put aid workers at risk. “As Oxfam we are independent and impartial,” says Fox. “Our job in Afghanistan is not to win hearts and minds. We are not there as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy.” When military forces start to play a role such as we’ve seen in Afghanistan, where they work with provincial reconstruction teams, that makes it more difficult to distinguish them from humanitarian workers – even though Oxfam provides support to people in need regardless of race, religion or political interests.

Private security also blurs that distinction, he says, because some governments are contracting out their security and development work to private companies. “Looking into the future, there may be more of it, but it doesn’t mean it’s a good idea.”

The Red Cross only uses armed protection in limited circumstances. “We base our concept of security on the fact that the parties on the ground accept us,” says Michael Khambatta, deputy head of delegates with the International Committee of the Red Cross. “We have to assess whether the people we’re speaking to actually have the control in the area we want to go to.” To be safe, aid workers must be – and be perceived to be – neutral and independent.

The Red Cross only uses armed protection for fixed locations, such as staff quarters and warehouses, in situations where there’s a law and order problem but it’s clear who controls the territory (and that’s done in co-ordination with the authorities concerned).

Or, if it gets into a situation where aid workers have come under attack, or know they’re going to be attacked. “We might ask the nearest armed forces that we trust to get us out, but this is usually a very long one-way ticket because we would no longer be perceived as neutral,” says Khambatta. “It could take us years to repair that. I can’t think of the last time we’ve done that.”

Nor does it pay ransoms. “The paying of ransoms creates a whole series of incentives that we don’t want to have in conflict areas,” he says. “Where we have had people taken for varying lengths of time, we’ve gotten them back.”

The concern with private security, he says, is who else those companies are working for, and if they’re associated with any other groups or governments. And, when you’ve got one set of white cars driving past another set of white cars, the locals don’t always truly understand the differences.

“We feel we can’t be somewhere until we’ve gotten the acceptance of the leaders and, in fact, the population,” says Khambatta. “Even using military aircraft in a natural disaster area in one part of the world can be seen in other contexts, and that’s not always acknowledged.” The Red Cross only uses military assets for logistics – such as moving cargo – as a last resort (that also falls under UN guidelines for use of military assets).

If there is an incident, then the Red Cross adapts the way it works. In 2003, its headquarters in Iraq were hit with a truck bomb, so it moved to a discrete form of management, working from a distance through its national staff. “We have had to take an approach that leaves far less of an imprint, and in parallel to ensure that we are building the contacts that will allow us to come back in an open way,” says Khambatta.

In many cases, security is more about risk avoidance through the gathering of information and plotting of trends. “That’s where we’re seeing interest from NGOs,” says MacKinnon, which includes spotting trends, passing on information and making recommendations.

For NGOs that don’t want an overt security presence, GardaWorld will work with them to create a crisis response plan, from security intelligence training, to kidnap and ransom training. “In Iraq, for example, you’ve got around 100 attacks a day in some areas, and you can plot where the bomb attacks are being carried out,” he says. “In those attacks there are lots of trends and patterns.” That can lead to recommendations, such as avoiding going out at certain times or taking different routes with different types of vehicles.

Aid workers can also be better prepared before they arrive in country, such as how to react in an ambush situation or firefight, says Ram. If they’re taken hostage, for example, they need to know what actually happens in a hostage situation and how to behave.

“There’s a lot of psychology in play here, but if you don’t know that, you’ll be freaked out,” he says. “Why am I actually having sympathy for the hostage-taker? This guy is potentially going to kill me. If you don’t address it before it happens, you’re going to be confused, you’re going to be in a panic situation.”


The security firm will also research the methods of operation of terrorist groups in a particular region. “Are they just interested in blowing you up or kidnapping you for ransom or propaganda?” says Ram. “That will tell me what level of security you as a client need.” After that, there’s an array of resources that can be deployed, from bomb-sniffing dogs to CCTV cameras to alarms – not to mention roaming patrols and armoured vehicles (which clients use in hot spots like Columbia).

So far, the American government has been the most aggressive in using private security to deliver aid programs, says Fox, and spends the largest portion of its aid budget within the U.S. “We have a concern about development effectiveness and the amount of money being spent on North Americans and Europeans, [who are] being paid $1,000 a day in a given country,” he says, “when in fact from a developmental perspective what we should be doing is tapping into the capacity of the people in that country to do this themselves.”

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